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INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following  question from the National 
Health Interview Survey (NHIS: AHB. 110)" 
How  often  do you  do  light  or  moderate  activities 
for at least  10 minutes  that cause  only  light sweating 
or a slight to moderate  increase  in breathing or heart 
rate? 
This  is  a  wordy  question,  but  we  believe  there  is 
something else that makes it difficult to  answer.  The 
problem,  as  we  see  it,  involves  the  event  category 
("light  or  moderate  activities  ...")  about  whose 
frequency respondents  are asked.  This  category seems 
to  be  at  odds  with  the  way  most  respondents  think 
about the  events that the  researchers  intend  to  count. 
When a  respondent  tides  her bike to  work  she  seems 
more  likely  to  think  of  it  as  "bicycling"  or 
"commuting"  or "stuff I do most mornings"  than as  a 
"light to moderate  activity."  It  seems  more  natural  to 
mentally  group  events  according  to  the  activities 
involved (bicycling, commuting) than according to the 
properties of the events (light to moderate). 
There is little relevant experimental evidence about 
this.  The one study that we are aware of demonstrates 
that people  are  less  accurate  when  asked  to  estimate 
how  many  instances  they  have  seen  from  categories 
organized  around  properties  than  from  more 
conventional  categories.  Barsalou  and  Ross  (1986) 
found that people  were relatively insensitive  to  actual 
frequency when estimating the frequency of properties 
(e.g.  sour);  their  estimates  were  about  the  same 
(between 2 and 3) when actual frequency varied from 0 
to  4.  They were  more  sensitive  when  estimating  the 
frequency  of  what  Barsalou  and  Ross  called 
superordinates  (e.g.  toys);  the  participants'  estimates 
for  these  categories  increased  as  actual  frequency 
increased.  If  this  finding  applies  to  answering  the 
survey  question  about  light  to  moderate  activities, 
respondents  might be inaccurate,  reporting  only some 
of  the  relevant  events  and,  possibly,  misreporting 
events from other categories as members of the one in 
question. 
Unnatural  Categories. Because  this  type  of event 
category  seems  to  differ  from  those  that  respondents 
use  spontaneously,  we  refer  to  them  as  unnatural 
categories.  It's as if they cut across more natural event 
categories  and,  so,  do  not  bring  to  the  respondent's 
mind  the  kinds  of  experiences  the  researchers  are 
interested  in.  For  example,  respondents  in  the  NHIS 
are asked "Do you now have  any health problem that 
requires you to use special equipment, such as a cane, a 
wheelchair,  a  special  bed,  or  a  special  telephone?" 
(NHIS AHS.070).  It is hard to think of other kinds  of 
special  equipment that might be  eligible for inclusion 
in  answering  the  question.  We  propose  that  this 
retrieval  is  difficult because  the  structures  into  which 
people  classify their  own  experiences  are,  essentially, 
orthogonal to the structure about which they have been 
asked.  Wheelchairs,  beds  and  telephones  involve 
distinct  mental  categories  for  most  people,  but 
respondents  are  asked  to  consider  events  about  all  of 
them  as  well  as  other  unnamed  equipment  that  is 
somehow similar. 
What  is  critical  in  predicting  the  likelihood  of 
retrieval  for  such  tasks  is  the  way  respondents  have 
encoded or classified events at the time they experience 
them.  Respondents  are unlikely to recall the kinds  of 
events  the  survey  designers  are  interested  in  if they 
have  encoded  those  events  as  members  of  other  - 
presumably more natural -  categories. 
This is not to suggest that there exists a  canonical, 
natural scheme that all respondents use to classify their 
experiences;  the  categories  which  people 
spontaneously use might vary in idiosyncratic ways and 
from one  situation to the next.  And people  may think 
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883 of an event or object as being an instance of multiple 
categories  at  the  same  time  (e.g.  Ross  and  Murphy, 
1999).  But  whatever  an  individual's  preferred 
classification  scheme,  it  seems  more  likely  to  be 
organized  around  actions  than  properties  or  other 
attributes of events. 
Researchers often have sound reasons for collecting 
information  about unnatural  event  categories,  though 
their  reasons  usually  have  little  to  do  with  the 
respondents'  conception  of  events.  For  example, 
respondents  in  the  Point  of  Purchase  Survey 
(conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics) are asked 
if, over the last week, they made any purchases or had 
any  expenses  for  "fats,  oils,  peanut  butter,  salad 
dressings, or dairy substitutes." It would be unlikely for 
most  respondents  to  spontaneously  group  these 
purchases  together;  the  survey  authors  group  these 
products  together  because  they  have  similar  price 
change  characteristics;  the  products  are  legitimately 
related  from  an  econometric  perspective  but  most 
respondents do not interpret their experiences from this 
perspective. 
Measurement  error.  The  cost  for  researchers  of 
directly asking about categories that respondents have 
not previously used  is  that  this  may compromise the 
quality of the information that is collected. When asked 
to  estimate  the  frequency  of  events  from  such 
categories,  respondents  will  likely  omit  events  from 
their totals that they  should  actually include  because 
the events just do not come to mind. This would lead to 
net underreporting.  As a thought experiment, think of 
how  many  products  you  have  purchased  in  the  last 
three years that contain Velcro.  The chances are good 
that you will find it hard to think of relevant purchases, 
presumably because we don't usually organize products 
on  the  basis  of their  attributes  like  Velcro.  Yet  the 
chances  are  also  good  that  you  have  purchased 
products with Velcro that you cannot recall. 
Conversely,  such  categories  may  bring  to  mind 
instances  that  really  should  be  excluded  but  are 
counted nonetheless.  This could happen because of the 
poor alignment between the  category in the  question 
and  respondents'  mental  categories.  If  it  is  not 
possible to retrieve instances stored as members of the 
test  category,  people  may  search  their  memories 
haphazardly,  retrieving  instances  that  the  survey 
authors  would  not  want  to  count.  For  example,  one 
might reason "perhaps that camera case that I bought 
contains Velcro?" when it really does not.  This would 
lead to net overreporting. 
Data  about  such  categories  may  be  further 
compromised because  answering  such  questions  may 
be more laborious than many respondents will tolerate. 
Informally, we have found that people can continue to 
recall  products  with  Velcro  after  more  than  five 
minutes  of  trying.  This  is  too  hard  for  most 
respondents. We have found that if respondents find it 
difficult to answer behavioral frequency questions, they 
are  likely to truncate  the  retrieval process  and  adjust 
their  total  to  account  for  unretrieved  information 
(Brown,  1995;  1997;  Conrad,  Brown  and  Cashman, 
1998). Such adjustment is usually inadequate. 
Behavioral  frequency  questions  (During  the  last 
month how many times did you ... ?) are very common 
in  surveys,  and  they  have  been  widely  studied  by 
survey  methodologists  and  psychologists  (e.g.  Blair 
and  Burton,  1987;  Brown,  1995,  1997;  Brown  & 
Sinclair,  1999;  Conrad,  Brown  and  Cashman,  1998; 
Menon,  1993).  One  of  the  major  themes  of  this 
literature  is  that  people  use  multiple  strategies  to 
answer these questions and particular  strategies  affect 
(1) the size and direction of error, and (2) the amount 
of effort required to produce an answer.  It is usually 
assumed that the categories in the questions correspond 
to the categories in respondents' heads. But as we have 
noted,  there  are  empirical  and  intuitive  reasons  to 
suspect this might not always be the case. 
We conducted two experiments to explore people's 
ability  to  answer  questions  about  the  frequency  of 
events  from  unnatural  categories.  In  particular,  we 
asked  if  people  are  less  accurate  at  estimating  the 
frequency  of events  from  unnatural  than  from  more 
natural  categories.  If so,  are  they biased,  that  is  do 
they  consistently  overestimate  or  underestimate?  Do 
people respond quickly or slowly?  How do they come 
up with their estimates? Are  some types of categories 
inherently  unnatural  (e.g.  properties)  or  can  they 
sometimes be used naturally? 
OVERVIEW OF EXPERIMENTAL METHOD 
Both  experiments  followed  the  same  basic 
procedure.  The  experimental  sessions  consisted  of  a 
study phase and a test phase.  During the study phase, 
109 common words (all of which were nouns) appeared 
one  at  a  time  on  a  computer  screen  in  front  of the 
participant  for  six  seconds  each.  The  words  were 
members  of 16  different  categories.  Participants  were 
instructed to study each of the words in order to answer 
some questions about them later.  This was designed to 
simulate experiencing everyday events about which one 
might be questioned in a survey. 
After completing the study phase, participants were 
asked  to  estimate  the  number  of instances  they  had 
studied from each of the  16 categories.  The categories 
were  either natural  or unnatural,  and  were  presented 
individually on a computer screen until the participant 
entered  a  numerical  response.  The  "correct" 
assignment of instances was based on published norms 
884 of frequently generated members  of categories  (Battig 
and  Montague,  1969;  McEvoy  and  Nelson,  1982; 
Underwood  and  Richardson,  1956),  not  on  our 
intuitions.  The actual frequency for each of the  16 test 
categories, that is the number of study items that were 
members of each,  ranged from 0 -  19.  The test phase 
was  intended  to  simulate  the  task  of  answering 
behavioral frequency questions in a survey. 
Each participant was exposed to the study items in 
a  different  random  order,  with  the  constraints  that 
items from the same category appeared in roughly even 
intervals  and two  items  from the  same  category were 
separated by at least one item from a different category. 
The test items were also presented to  each participant 
in a different random order. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
We conducted the first experiment to investigate (1) 
the patterns of response accuracy when people estimate 
the frequency of instances from natural  and unnatural 
categories,  and  (2) the  range  of strategies  they use to 
produce these estimates.  Two  groups  of 8 participants 
completed the study and test phases of the experiment. 
Both  studied  similar types  words  (e.g.  Dog,  Chicago, 
Guitar  ...)  but  differed  in  the  kinds  of categories  on 
which they were tested.  One  group  was  tested  on the 
number  of  instances  from  common  taxonomic 
categories  (e.g.  TREE,  FISH,  FURNITURE,  TOOL 
...).  We  chose  these  to  correspond  to  the  categories 
that  most  participants  would  naturally  use,  at  least 
some of the time.  The other group was asked to report 
the  number  of words  with  particular  properties  (e.g. 
SMELLY,  YELLOW,  FUZZY,  ROUND).  These 
served  as  our  unnatural  categories.  All  respondents 
were asked to think aloud as they estimated the number 
of instances for each category in the test phase. 
Results.  One  measure  of  overall  accuracy  is  the 
correlation  between  each  estimate  and  the  actual 
frequency.  By this  measure  the  taxonomic  group  (r 
=.73)  was  almost  three  times  as  accurate  as  the 
property group  (r  =  .28).  Actual frequency,  therefore, 
was  a  substantially  better  predictor  of  estimated 
frequency  for  the  taxonomic  group  than  for  property 
group.  Yet it was  certainly not a  perfect predictor  for 
the taxonomic group. Most of the error for both groups 
was  due  to  underestimation.  Average  estimated 
frequency (the grand mean at each level of frequency) 
is plotted  against  actual  frequency in Figure  1.  If the 
estimates were perfectly accurate they would be plotted 
on the  diagonal  axis  running  from  0  to  19.  Instead, 
almost  all  of the  points  in  the  figure  fall  below  this 
axis.  The slopes of the regression lines are less than  1 
for both groups,  .44  (r  2=  92)  and  .22  (r2=.46)  for the 
taxonomic  and  property  groups  respectively.  The 
underestimation bias is more extreme for the property 
group, F(1,127)=5.68, p<.05. 
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Figure 1. Actual versus estimated frequency 
Despite  this  underestimation  bias,  participants  in 
the  property  group  actually  overestimated  the  true 
frequency  when  it  was  low,  interaction  of  group  x 
actual  frequency,  F(9,127)=6.01,  p<.001.  More 
specifically,  when  true  frequency  was  zero,  these 
participants  reported  having  studied  2.9  words  with 
those  properties.  This  sort  of  overestimation,  if  it 
happens  in  real  survey  contexts,  would  be  especially 
troubling  when  it  comes  to  answering  questions  like 
"During  the  past  week  did  you  have  purchases  or 
expenditures  for  fats,  oils,  peanut  butter,  salad 
dressings,  or  dairy  substitutes?"  For  such  questions, 
this  type  of  overestimation  qualitatively  changes  the 
response from "no" (the correct answer) to "yes." 
What might cause this overestimation? Because the 
participants thought out loud during the test phase,  we 
often could tell which of the study instances they were 
considering  in  their  estimates.  We  classified  every 
instance  that  participants  specifically  mentioned  as 
either  correct  or  incorrect,  based  on  the  published 
norms. A correct instance was one that appeared in the 
norms  for  the  test  category  or  property;  an  incorrect 
instance appeared in the norms for one of the other test 
categories  or  properties,  or,  in  a  few  cases  did  not 
appear  in the  norms  at  all.  Almost  all  of the  items 
specifically enumerated by the taxonomic  participants 
were  correct,  but  a  high  percentage  of  the  items 
enumerated by the property participants were incorrect. 
On average the taxonomic participants mentioned 2.04 
correct  instances  and  .05  that  were  incorrect;  in 
contrast property participants based their estimates  on 
only .93  correct instances but 2.02 that were incorrect. 
Apparently  when  properties  serve  as  stimuli  (in  the 
laboratory  and,  presumably,  in  survey questions)  they 
bring  to  mind  instances  that  often  better  exemplify 
other properties than the one being tested.  We call this 
@target enumeration.  This is the first time we  have 
observed this strategy. 
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,= On the basis of the think aloud protocols we coded 
the  strategies  that  participants  used  to  produce  their 
estimates.  Participants used one of three  strategies for 
almost  all  of  their  estimates:  enumeration,  adjusted 
enumeration and general impressions. Broadly defined, 
enumeration  involves  summing  retrieved  instances 
(e.g.  "I  remember  milk,  snow  and  sugar  so  I'll  say 
three  things  were  white.").  Enumeration  was  coded 
when  the  number  of  items  listed  in  the  protocol 
equaled  the  number  entered  into  the  computer. 
Adjusted enumeration was coded when the number of 
enumerated  items  differed  from the  response  entered 
into the computer. The use of general impressions was 
indicated by  qualitative  statements  of frequency  (e.g. 
"There were a lot of those." or "I saw a few fish."). 
The  proportions  of the  codable  strategies  used by 
the  two  groups  were  quite  different.  The  property 
group relied overwhelmingly on enumeration (80% of 
their  responses  were  based  on  this  strategy).  The 
taxonomic group made more balanced use of the three 
strategies (20%, 53% and 24% of their responses were 
based  on  enumeration,  adjusted  enumeration  and 
general impressions, respectively). One explanation for 
this pattern is that the participants in both groups did 
not  encode  the  study  instances  in  terms  of  their 
properties  and  so  when  those  in  the  property  group 
were  tested,  they  did  not  have  any  pre-existing 
impressions  of property  frequency  on  which  to  base 
their  estimates  or  adjust  their  tallies  of  enumerated 
instances. In contrast, taxonomic participants were able 
to supplement their memory of the study instances with 
impressions  formed  during  the  study  phase.  We 
propose that in order to form impressions of frequency 
for  a  particular  category,  people  need  to  use  that 
category when they engage in and encode the relevant 
activities  into their memories.  This  was  more  likely 
the case with taxonomic than property categories. 
The  performance  of  property  participants  is 
particularly  troubling  because  they  consistently 
enumerated-  even  though  other  strategies  could 
potentially  have  improved  their  estimates  and  even 
though  more  than  two  of  every  three  items  they 
enumerated were incorrect. 
Summary.  Experiment  1 indicated that people  are 
quite inaccurate at estimating the frequency of one type 
of unnatural category, properties.  They show a  strong 
underestimation  bias  -  much  greater  than  their 
counterparts estimating the frequency of instances from 
taxonomic  categories.  And  they  overestimate  at  the 
low  end  of the  frequency  scale,  in  particular,  when 
actual  frequency  is  0.  We  attribute  this  low  end 
overestimation  to  off-target  enumeration-  counting 
misclassified  instances  of  exemplars  of  the  test 
property.  Survey data based on such estimates would 
be  of  inherently  poor  quality  and  potentially 
misleading. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
While  it  is  clear  that  people  were  inaccurate  in 
estimating the frequency of properties in Experiment 1, 
it  is  not  clear  if  this  is  because  properties  are  an 
inherently poor way to organize events or because they 
are just not noticed as  often as  other event attributes, 
like the actions involved.  Is it possible that if several 
events  share  a  salient  property,  people  will  think  of 
these as a group?  If this is the case, then there might 
be occasions when survey researchers  can collect high 
quality data about property-based  categories  -  if they 
can determine that people pay attention to the property 
at the time the event is experienced.  For example,  it 
could be that people classify episodes of acute pain (a 
property)  as  members  of a  painful  episode  category, 
even  if  the  individual  events  are  otherwise  quite 
different. 
We  examined  this  in  Experiment  2  by  asking  a 
group of 15 participants to study the same items as the 
property group  in Experiment  1,  only this  time  each 
study  word  was  presented  along  with  the  relevant 
property  (e.g.  Corn-  YELLOW,  Ammonia- 
SMELLY, Chocolate- BROWN, Garbage- SMELLY 
...).  We  refer to these  participants  as the  instance  + 
property  group.  The  idea  was  to  make  properties 
salient  by  presenting  them  specifically.  In  the  test 
phase,  this  group  estimated  the  frequency  of  the 
properties  that  appeared  in the  study phase.  If they 
were  to  encode  each  instance  presented  in  the  study 
phase in terms of the property it was presented with, 
then the properties would serve as natural categories in 
the  sense  mentioned  earlier.  We  would  expect  the 
instance + property group to perform in the test phase 
much  as  the  taxonomic  group  performed  in 
Experiment  1.  On the  other  hand,  it is  possible  that 
people will not use  even very noticeable properties to 
organize  events.  In  this  case  we  would  expect  the 
instance + property group to perform like the property 
group in the first experiment. 
To help evaluate the performance of this group, we 
also asked another group of 15 participants to study the 
instances  without  explicit  properties,  just  as  the 
property group did in the first experiment; we refer to 
them as the instance-only group. They were then tested 
on  the  same  properties  as  the  instance  +  property 
group.  We  expected  the  instance-only  group  to 
perform just like the property group because their study 
and test items were identical. 
ff the two groups respond like their counterparts in 
the  first  experiment,  we  might  attribute  the  accuracy 
886 differences  in  the  both  experiments  to  more  diligent 
performance  by  the  more  accurate  group,  perhaps 
because they searched for instances longer.  If so, lower 
accuracy should  be  associated  with  quicker  responses 
than  would  higher  accuracy.  On  the  other  hand,  it 
could  be  that  inaccurate  estimation  of  property 
frequency is due to the inherent difficulty of retrieving 
exemplars  when  the  instances  were  not  encoded  in 
terms of the test property.  In this case, lower accuracy 
would be  associated  with  slower  response  times  than 
higher  accuracy.  To  test  this  we  measured  response 
time from the presentation  of each test item until the 
participant  entered a response  (pressed the  enter key). 
In  order  to  measures  estimation  time  as  cleanly  as 
possible,  we  did  not ask the participants  to  think  out 
loud. 
Results.  The  instance  +  property  group  was 
relatively  accurate  overall.  The  correlation  between 
their  estimates  and  actual  frequency  was  r=.76, 
virtually  the  same  as  what  we  observed  for  the 
taxonomic group in Experiment  1.  The instance-only 
group  was  quite  inaccurate.  The  correlation  between 
their  estimates  and  actual  frequency  was  r=. 16,  even 
less accurate than the property group in Experiment  1. 
Again,  most  of the  error was  due  to  underestimation 
for both groups. The slopes of the regression lines were 
less  than  1  for  both  groups,  .61  (r 2  =  .93)  for  the 
instance  +  property  group  and  .05  (r  2 =  .04)  for  the 
property  group.  As  in  Experiment  1,  the 
underestimation bias was more  extreme for the  group 
that  studied  instances  in  isolation  (the  instance-only 
group in the current experiment, the property group in 
the first experiment), F (1,328) = 3.97, p<.05. 
Despite  the  severe  underestimation  bias  displayed 
by  the  instance-only  group,  these  participants 
overestimated  at the  low  end  of the  actual  frequency 
range  to  a  greater  degree.  The  difference  between 
actual and  estimated  frequency is  displayed in Figure 
2.  Perfect  estimation  would  lead to  a  difference  of 0. 
Instance-only  respondents  substantially  overestimated 
actual  frequencies  between  0  and  4  while 
underestimating  actual frequencies between 7  and  19. 
In  contrast  the  instance  +  property  group  was  quite 
accurate  across  the  low  end  of the  frequency  range, 
while they showed  only moderate underestimation  for 
higher  values,  interaction  of  group  and  actual 
frequency F(9,252)= 8.02, p<.001. 
The  poor  performance  of the  instance-only  group 
was not the result of rushing their responses.  In fact 
they  took  three  times  as  long  (12.4  seconds  per 
response)  as  the  instance  +  property  group  (4.2 
seconds)  to  produce  their  estimates  (F  [1,28]=26.99, 
p<.001)  and  these  estimates  were  substantially  less 
accurate.  Participants  apparently find  it  quite  difficult 
to  retrieve  instances  with  the  test  properties  even 
though they work hard (or at least long) at the task. 
In  addition  to  characterizing  overall  speed,  the 
response  times  supplement  the  Experiment  1  think 
aloud  data  in  helping  to  explain  how  the  different 
groups  produced  their  estimates.  A  response  time 
function  that  increases  with  actual  frequency 
implicates enumeration.  The reasoning is that it takes 
a fixed amount of time to retrieve an instance and add 
it to the total; the more of these that are retrieved,  the 
longer the response time (Brown,  1995,  1996;  Conrad, 
Brown  &  Cashman,  1998).  This  is  also  the  case  for 
adjusted  enumeration,  though  the  function  is  not  as 
steep  as for pure  enumeration.  In contrast,  a  fast,  flat 
response time function may indicate the use of general 
impressions  because  it  takes  as  long  to  retrieve  an 
impression  of "very rarely"  as  an  impression  of  "all 
the time." 
We expect the instance-only group to use the 
same off-target enumeration  strategy that the property 
group did in the first experiment.  However, we do not 
know  what the response  time  function  will  look  like. 
At the very least there is no reason to expect response 
times to change systematically with actual frequency. 
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Figure  2.  Difference  between  estimated  and  actual 
frequency, Experiment 2. 
Median  response  time  is  plotted  against  actual 
frequency  in  Figure  3.  The  functions  are  quite 
different  (interaction  of actual  frequency  and  context 
F[9,252]  =  3.54,  p  <  .001)  suggesting  that  the  two 
groups  used  fundamentally  different  strategies.  The 
instance  +  property  participants  enumerated  in  well 
known  ways much  of the  time,  as  did  the  taxonomic 
group  in  Experiment  1.  The  slope  is  0.44  (r  2 =.42). 
The  main  point  is  that  the  pattern  is  familiar  and 
consistent. 
The  instance-only  group,  in  contrast,  shows  no 
clear  evidence  of  any  strategy  with  which  we  are 
familiar.  Their average estimates fluctuate widely and 
the  slope  of  the  response  time  function  is  slightly 
887 negative,  -.24 @2  =.04).  Off-target  enumeration 
appears to be a  noisy process,  suggesting participants 
are grasping for information. 
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Figure 3. Median response times, Experiment 2 
Summary. If several events share a salient property, 
participants can think of the events as members of the 
same  category.  Instance  +  property  participants 
performed  much  like  the  taxonomic  group  in 
Experiment  1.  They were relatively accurate,  though 
they underestimated  overall,  and they seemed to base 
many  of  their  estimates  on  the  same  kind  of 
enumeration  strategies.  Apparently  properties  can 
serve as natural categories under some circumstances. 
Instance-only participants were both inaccurate and 
slow, reflecting the inherent difficulty of the task. They 
overestimated  at  the  low  end  of  the  range  and 
underestimated at the high end. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Experimental  participants  perform  quite  poorly 
when estimating the frequency of events from one kind 
of unnatural category, properties.  It seems likely that 
survey respondents do as well.  What can practitioners 
do  about  this  type  of  measurement  error?  One 
guideline that question authors  can follow is to  avoid 
asking for the frequency of events defined by adjectives 
(e.g.  light to moderate, special equipment).  Of course, 
the  analytical  goals  of  a  survey  may  still  involve 
estimates  of properties.  In  this  case,  authors  might 
decompose  unnatural  categories  into  their  natural 
parts.  Instead  of  asking  about  light  to  moderate 
activities,  they  might  ask  about  walking,  bicycling, 
cleaning the house, mowing the lawn, etc. This leads to 
many  questions  instead  of  one,  which  generally 
lengthens  the  interview.  But  our response  time  data 
indicate that the time to answer one question about an 
unnatural  category  may be  greater  than  the  time  to 
answer  several  questions  about  natural  component 
categories, and the results will be more accurate. 
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